The Partner-Manager: Some Thoughts on Bebchuk and Fried by Mitchell, Lawrence E.
 
(57) 
 
RESPONSE 
 
THE PARTNER-MANAGER:  SOME THOUGHTS  
ON BEBCHUK AND FRIED 
LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL †
In response to Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-
Term Performance, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915 (2010). 
 
 
When did corporate executives cease to be employees of their 
corporations and become partners with their shareholders, and senior 
partners at that?  What were the effects of this transformation?  On 
one hand, the answer to the first question is simple and the second 
question, while a bit more complex, is also not difficult to answer.  On 
the other hand, one can see each question as having significant depth 
and complexity.  It is my goal in this Response to begin to probe the 
deeper and more complex aspects of these questions. 
No two scholars have done more to address the problems of ex-
ecutive compensation and to offer thoughtful and thorough answers 
than Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried.  Indeed Bebchuk has spent 
time in the trenches, consulting for the Special Master for the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).  They have plumbed the 
depths of the sources of the problem, and offered creative and com-
prehensive solutions to the issues they identify.1
 
†
Theodore Reinhart Professor of Business Law, The George Washington Univer-
sity Law School.  
  One could critique 
several of their suggestions—and perhaps the effectiveness of their en-
tire reform package—on theoretical and practical grounds, but this 
would be nitpicking for its own sake.  As a conceptual matter, it is 
1
I agree with Bebchuk and Fried’s assertion that the structure of executive pay 
has been a significant cause of managerial short-termism.  See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, 
CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY 109-11 (2001) (describing how executive compensation 
tied to stock price sacrifices long-term strategy). 
58 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 57 
PENNumbra 
hard to argue with their conclusions.  The only critique of their re-
forms that I will make in this Response is to note that the complexity 
of their proposals and the monitoring problems associated with them 
might lead them to work less effectively than their authors would like.2
So I shall not take them on their own terms.  I will, instead, place 
Bebchuk and Fried’s work in the broader context of the two questions 
with which I began.  This exercise will reveal what I consider to be a 
fundamental question that remains with respect to the core of their 
work and regards the premise with which they begin:  the partnership 
of senior executives with shareholders, the state of the compensation 
world as it is.  This starting point, of course, is practical, at least if Beb-
chuck and Fried are to see their proposals adopted.
  
But if one takes the suggested reforms on their own terms, even 
though one could quibble with the details, Bebchuk and Fried’s work 
is compelling. 
3  Few people re-
make the world through scholarship.  But starting with the world as it is 
embeds a certain degree of fatalism or, perhaps, naturalism, into their 
work as it does into any scholarship.  It disregards the broader context in 
which the problem arises and therefore prevents the authors from reach-
ing arguably broader conclusions.  By treating compensation in relative 
isolation, their proposals do not address compensation in the broader 
context of the changes in corporate governance they create.4
In particular, I will first suggest (as effectively as I can in limited 
space) that the problem of executive compensation is quite recent.  
Indeed, no corporate executive was paid more than a million dollars 
  Thus, I of-
fer these thoughts as a friendly addition to their excellent work. 
 
2
Bebchuk and Fried acknowledge this problem with respect to their proposal to 
eliminate the possibility of executives hedging their restricted stock or stock options.  
See Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1915, 1953 (“No matter how strong the restrictions and limitations [on hedg-
ing] are in theory, they will not do much if executives can circumvent them in practice.”). 
3
To their great credit, they have in fact had some real impact on the way execu-
tive compensation is structured.  See Compensation Structure and Systemic Risk:  Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs. 111th Cong. 32 (2009) (written testimony submitted 
by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Professor, Harvard Law School) (urging Congress to “tighten[] 
the link between compensation and long-term results”); see also Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Treasury, THE SPECIAL MASTER FOR TARP EXECUTIVE COMP. CONCLUDES THE 
REVIEW OF PRIOR PAYMENTS (Jul. 23, 2010), available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg786.htm (discussing Bebchuk’s written tes-
timony submitted to the House Committee on Financial Services). 
4
Bebchuk has addressed compensation in the context of the changes it creates in 
corporate governance with respect to other corporate stakeholders in financial corpo-
rate governance, but not shareholders.  See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, 
Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 251 n.11 (2010). 
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before 1980 (after the compensation excesses of the 1930s, that is).5  
As Alfred Chandler so carefully details,6 executives were paid as em-
ployees, which they were.  It is also important to note that the era of 
relatively modest executive pay spanned the era of managerialism, a 
period in which top management was thought to have managed cor-
porations for their own benefit, and that pay exploded only after the 
institutionalization of the independent monitoring board.7  Finally, it 
is worth noting that during the era of relatively modest executive pay, 
the United States’ gross domestic product (GDP) grew at its fastest 
rate in a century and more.8  And this growth occurred despite the 
relative absence of paradigm-changing technological innovation that 
characterized the late nineteenth and early and late twentieth centu-
ries.  Indeed this extraordinary GDP growth preceded the era of hos-
tile takeovers, venture capital financing, and private equity owner-
ship,9
Considered this way, one has to question the acceptance of cur-
rent levels of executive compensation as somehow normal or inevita-
ble, and the degree to which it leads senior executives to serve society 
by running their corporations as efficiently as possible.  In order to do 
that, one needs to look at the new corporate governance model such 
compensation has generated, one in which what I shall call the “part-
ner-manager” is central.  Indeed, one has to wonder whether the in-
centives of the partner-manager inevitably lead her to work for herself 
to the potential disadvantage of the corporation and its shareholders.  
Ultimately, this raises the question of whether Bebchuk and Fried’s 
 not to mention the development of complex and supposedly 
more efficient financial markets. 
 
5
See Harwell Wells, “No Man Can Be Worth $1,000,000 A Year”:  The Fight Over Execu-
tive Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 689, 761 (2010) (noting that no 
compensation package exceeded one million dollars from the 1940s through the 1970s). 
6
See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER JR., THE VISIBLE HAND:  THE MANAGERIAL 
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977). 
7
Compare Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 
1950-2005:  Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1469 
(2007) (arguing that independent directors maximize shareholder value by enhancing 
fidelity, reliability of public disclosure, and responsiveness), with Lawrence E. Mitchell, 
The Trouble with Boards, in PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 17, 20 (F. Scott 
Kieff & Troy A. Paredes eds., 2010) (reading history to tell a “darker story” and posit-
ing that independent boards arose to protect directors from liability and avoid fidu-
ciary obligations). 
8
 Gross Domestic Product Percent Change from Preceding Period, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE (Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.bea.gov/national/xls/gdpchg.xls. 
9
Whatever else one might say about venture capital and private equity financing, 
both clearly embrace a model of partner management in the context of privately 
owned enterprises and carefully negotiated arrangements. 
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reforms, persuasive as they are, are sufficient to address the problem 
rather than a symptom. 
THE RISE OF THE PARTNER-MANAGER 
The sweep of American corporate history shows an interesting 
evolution from entrepreneurial managers to partner-managers.  Dur-
ing the latter half of the nineteenth century, American industrial cor-
porations were run by the men who had created them.10  There was no 
public market to speak of, except in the case of some railroads and 
banks, and entrepreneurs like Carnegie, Havemeyer, Harriman and 
Rockefeller took their wealth as controlling partners and shareholders 
of closely-held firms.11  Their compensation was less for their services 
than, as with all entrepreneurs, their risk, and their rewards were of-
ten rich, commensurate with the risks they took.12
As Chandler demonstrates, even as these entrepreneur managers 
were building and profiting from their businesses, another class of 
managers was developing.
 
13  The unique circumstances of the rai-
lroads led to the development of the first class of employee managers 
who were hired to run the details of businesses as they grew larger and 
ever more complex.14  These managers were not entrepreneurs.  Their 
compensation wasn’t based on risk, for the risks they took were not 
those of entrepreneurs but of ordinary employees.  Quite literally, 
they were paid to keep the trains running on time.15
As the market for industrial and other securities exploded at the 
end of the nineteenth century, entrepreneurs either sold their stock 
in the giant public combinations (often retaining stock in the newly 
public companies) or sold some or all of their stock on the market.
 
16
 
10
See EDWARD CHASE KIRKLAND, INDUSTRY COMES OF AGE 195-216 (1961) (noting 
that under this arrangement, there existed “a widespread belief that . . . the managers, 
since they had a genuine stake in an enterprise, would be more energetic, efficient, and 
prudent in the conduct of its affairs”).  
  
11
Id. 
12
Id. 
13
See CHANDLER, supra note 6, at 9-10, 87, 95, 415-16 (explaining that the in-
creased use of such managers, particularly common among the railroads, was necessary as 
companies merged or otherwise increased in size and expertise in coordinating complex 
operations).  
14
Id. at 87.  
15
Id. at 105-06.  Of course, these managers were also expected to maintain track 
and rolling stock, manage finances, and the like.  Id. 
16
See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY 90-112 (2007) (de-
scribing the increasing importance of the stock market in American life at the turn of 
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Although some would retain a measure of control for a considerable 
period of time, others left their businesses to the care of the invest-
ment bankers who brought them to market and to the professional 
managers they hired.  Thus began the separation of ownership and 
control that Thorstein Veblen observed in 1904,17 and the observation 
for which Berle and Means were celebrated following their 1932 pub-
lication.18  While later commentators have overstated the fact of sepa-
ration,19 it is nonetheless clear that by the time Berle and Means 
wrote, professional management ruled both board and company.  
And while the evidence suggests that during this age of managerial-
ism, corporate executives owned significant amounts of stock in their 
corporations, their compensation largely was paid in the form of cash 
salary, like that of other employees—and in relatively moderate 
amounts at that.20
The 1970s’ attack on managerialism broke up the insider board 
(which in fact typically had some number of outside directors) and 
led to the rapid development and acceptance of the monitoring 
board.  By 1985, it was clear that a corporate board dominated by in-
siders was a board at greater risk of legal liability than a board com-
 
 
the twentieth century); see also NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT 
IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895-1904, at 120-26 (1985) (detailing the common practice of 
smaller firms being sold to larger, multiplant firms); Thomas R. Navin & Marian V. 
Sears, The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities, 1887-1902, 29 BUS. HIST. REV. 105, 116-
38 (1955) (explaining the liquidity-enhancing effect of stock market listing in the late 
nineteenth century); Marian V. Sears, The American Businessman at the Turn of the Cen-
tury, 30 BUS. HIST. REV. 382, 411-17 (1956) (detailing the increased attention to and 
spreading of ownership that resulted from stock market listing at the turn of the century). 
17
See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 266-67 (1904) 
(discussing the transfer of business decisionmaking authority from owners to managers). 
18
See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 66 (Harcourt, Brace & World, rev. ed. 1967) (“As the ownership of 
corporate wealth has become more widely dispersed, ownership of that wealth and 
control over it have come to lie less and less in the same hands.”). 
19
Cf. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY, supra note 16, at 272-74 (explain-
ing that complete separation between ownership and control is an inaccurate observa-
tion since managers tended to invest heavily in the stock of their own corporations). 
20
Id.  See also Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration:  Where We’ve Been, 
How We Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them 25 (Eur. Corp. Governance 
Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 44/2004, 2004), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=561305 (showing that the rapid increase in executive 
compensation is largely the result of stock option issuance); Carola Frydman &  
Raven E. Saks, Historical Trends in Executive Compensation 1936-2003 16-17 (Nov. 15, 
2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/workshops/ 
AppliedEcon/archive/pdf/FrydmanSecondPaper.pdf (noting that nearly all executive 
compensation was in the form of cash prior to the 1980s).  
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posed largely of independent directors.21  And as Melvin Eisenberg so 
persuasively argued in the late 1960s and early 1970s, only a board of 
independent directors could perform the central task that was the 
proper province of directors anyway:  monitoring the management of 
their corporations.22  The creation of the independent monitoring 
board appeared perfectly designed to redress the perceived problems 
of managerialism.  Whether it was effective in improving corporate 
performance is an issue beyond the scope of this Response.23
But the general acceptance of the independent monitoring board 
created a different corporate governance problem.  While the mana-
gerial board had intimate knowledge of the corporation’s business 
and affairs, the independent monitoring board—a board composed of 
fully-employed members who had little time to commit to the affairs 
of the corporation—had to develop monitoring tools that fit the time 
available for their work and fulfilled their basic monitoring responsi-
bilities.  Stock price came to be the most easily accessed metric and—
in an era in which markets were said to be highly efficient—appeared 
to serve as a reasonable proxy for corporate performance.  Stock also 
became a logical way to compensate employee managers since this 
type of payment would direct their efforts toward the improvement of 
corporate performance as manifested by stock price. 
 
At the same time, the independent monitoring board created a 
power vacuum.  Where at one point manager-directors had relatively 
equal access to information, the new board model with its part-time 
directors left the lion’s share of corporate information—and certainly 
the most significant, intangible information—in the hands of the 
CEO.  All well-designed bureaucratic structures are designed to chan-
nel information to the top.24
 
21
See Mitchell, supra note 7, at 51-53 (describing corporate America in the mid-1980s 
as being “thick in the boom of hostile takeovers, insider-trading scandals, the prolifera-
tion of junk bonds, and renewed Congressional attention,” which contributed to the de-
sire of corporations to minimize legal risks by having boards of independent directors). 
  The top of the new corporate gover-
22
See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 172-77 (1976) 
(detailing the ways in which permitting a corporation’s executives to sit on the board is 
“inconsistent with the board’s advice and function”). 
23
But see, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, Independent Directors, in 2 NEW PAL-
GRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 283 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) 
(“[S]tudies of overall firm performance have found no convincing empirical evidence that 
firms with majority-independent boards achieve better performance than other firms.”). 
24
See ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 24-25 (1967) (defining, in part, bu-
reaucracies as organizations that are large enough that, in general, highest ranking 
members know less than half of all other members because of efficient communica-
tion); MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 956-57 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich 
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nance model was the CEO, who now had the ability to determine the 
quality and amount of information available to the independent di-
rectors.  Among this information was, of course, the CEO’s perfor-
mance.25  Compensation committees had perhaps better information 
than did the independent directors more generally, and the compen-
sation consultant business began to boom,26
Thus began the third phase of the development of executive 
compensation, the partner-manager phase, and it is this phase of the 
development of executive compensation that Bebchuk and Fried ad-
dress.  It is in the early stages of this phase that the separation of own-
ership and control perhaps was more complete than in any other era, 
despite the growing power of institutional investors.  A logical corpo-
rate governance corollary of this reality was to tie the executive’s in-
terests more closely to those of the corporation’s shareholders.  Sup-
ported firmly by academics, Congress enshrined this principle in a 
1993 amendment to the Internal Revenue Code.
 but the imperial CEO had 
been created and was firmly in control. 
27
This brief historical survey should make it clear that the develop-
ment of a corporate economy in which executive compensation is 
largely composed of such large amounts of stock, representing a non-
negligible percentage ownership of the corporation’s shares, was 
hardly inevitable and only of quite recent vintage.
  The rest, as they 
say, is history. 
28
 
eds., 1978) (describing characteristics of modern bureaucracy, including a model of 
administrative efficiency of information and actions). 
  The amounts of 
stock paid to and owned by top executives in fact make them partners 
with shareholders in the business, albeit partners without the mutual 
agency obligations and unlimited liability that characterize partners in 
25
See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structural Holes, CEOs, and Informational Monopolies:  
The Missing Link in Corporate Governance, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1346 (2005) (noting 
that the elimination of board ties to corporate insiders led to increased dependence 
on the chief executive for information). 
26
See Brian Cadman et al., The Incentives of Compensation Consultants and CEO Pay, 
49 J. ACCT. & ECON. 263, 279 (2009) (“[W]e find that 755 of 880 firms in our initial 
sample retain compensation consultants, suggesting that the use of consultants is wide-
spread.”); Kevin J. Murphy & Tatiana Sandino, Executive Pay and “Independent” Compen-
sation Consultants, 49 J. ACCT. & ECON. 247, 260 (2009) (finding that compensation 
consultants increasingly work exclusively with compensation committees). 
27
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) (2006)) (detailing restrictions to deduc-
tions on “excessive employee remuneration”). 
28
Managerial stock ownership of exchange-listed corporations rose from thirteen 
percent in 1935 to twenty-one percent in 1995.  Clifford G. Holderness et al., Were the 
Good Old Days That Good?  Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depres-
sion, 54 J. FIN. 435, 436 (1999). 
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the legal form.29
Investment banks provide a nice example of this governance prob-
lem, even following the transformation of some into bank holding 
companies and the absorption of others into larger, financial conglo-
merates.  Members of the New York Stock Exchange were prohibited 
from incorporating prior to 1953.
  The incentive of relatively unrestrained partners is to 
maximize their own wealth—if necessary at the expense of others—
and it is clear that top corporate executives in the age of partner-
managers have done precisely this, as Bebchuk and Fried show.  Beb-
chuk and Fried have done an excellent job of designing restraints for 
these incentives.  The question remains whether restraints alone, 
without altering incentives, will be fully effective.  The governance 
problem created by modern executive compensation is not a problem 
of compensation alone; it is a broader one that goes to the heart of 
the nature of the modern, public corporation. 
30  This placed natural checks on 
their risk taking and ability to raise capital, as well as on the compen-
sation of their partners.  Members of the New York Stock Exchange 
were prohibited from offering their stock to the public prior to Donald-
son, Lufkin, and Jenrette’s (DLJ) defiance of the rule in 1970.31  The-
reafter, almost every major investment bank fell into line and became 
publicly held.32
 
29
It is, I believe, well recognized that fiduciary duties provide only modest re-
straints, and perhaps less so in the area of executive compensation than in other di-
mensions of the corporation’s business.  See, e.g., William A. Birdthistle, Investment In-
discipline:  A Behavioral Approach to Mutual Fund Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 61, 61-
64 (2010) (anticipating the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 
130 S. Ct. 1418, 1426 (2010), establishing a standard whereby investment advisers face 
liability for fiduciary breaches when charging fees that are “disproportionately large”); 
Kenneth R. Davis, Taking Stock--Salary and Options Too:  The Looting of Corporate America, 69 
MD. L. REV. 419, 425-35 (2010) (discussing the influence of Bebchuk and Fried in the 
field of executive compensation and detailing several critiques thereof); Wells, supra note 
  This of course allowed them to raise considerably 
5, at 736-37 (illustrating courts’ unwillingness to cap executive compensation). 
30
See NYSE Votes Permissive Incorporation, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 6, 
1953, at 14 (reporting on the 1953 amendment making the corporate form available). 
31 See JOHN BROOKS, THE GO-GO YEARS 316 (1973) (discussing W.H. Donaldson’s 
remarks on “the impermanence of Wall Street capital” prior to DLJ’s actions forced 
the rule to change). 
32
See Michael Hayes, The Vanishing Partnership, REGISTERED REP. Jan. 2000, availa-
ble at http://registeredrep.com/mag/finance_vanishing_partnership/ (discussing the 
rapid and lasting changes at the NYSE motivated by DLJ’s actions); Andrew von Nor-
denflycht, The Demise of the Professional Partnership?  The Emergence and Diffusion 
of Publicly-Traded Professional Service Firms 20-25 (Nov. 2008) (unpublished draft), 
available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/LegalProfession/documents/ 
vonNordenflychtPaper.pdf (recounting DLJ’s move to reform ownership requirements 
and its support by Merrill Lynch). 
2010] The Partner-Manager 65 
greater amounts of capital and take greater risks with shareholders’ 
money now that monitoring management became a meaningful issue. 
But while their form was corporate and their capital structure 
public, these investment banks largely retained the trappings of part-
nerships.  Look, for example, at the percentages of earnings invest-
ment banks pay in compensation compared to the balance retained 
for their public shareholders.  For instance, in the first quarter of 
2010, Goldman Sachs had net revenues of $12.75 billion, net earnings 
of $3.4 billion, and paid compensation and benefits (deducted from 
net revenue) of $5.5 billion, leaving $3.3 billion for its common 
shareholders.33  On net revenue of almost $8 billion in the second 
quarter of 2010, Morgan Stanley paid $3.9 billion as compensation, 
with $1.6 billion going to the shareholders.34  The story is easily re-
peated with respect to JP Morgan Chase, Merrill Lynch, and the late 
Bear Stearns.35
Tying compensation to performance is a worthy effort.  But the 
partnership model of corporate management raises broader questions 
of corporate governance and performance, questions that Bebchuk 
and Fried do not address because they take the current compensation 
model as their starting point.  It also raises questions regarding the re-
lationship of executive compensation to real economic growth.  The 
answers may all be positive, but the question needs to be addressed at 
a deep economic level.  While it is the last refuge of academic scoun-
drels to do so, I plead an inability to even begin to address these 
broader problems in a note of this nature.  With deep respect for Beb-
chuk and Fried’s work, I simply raise the questions for another day. 
  In no other industry is the partner-manager so ob-
viously institutionalized.  Yet what is true in investment banks has also 
become true (although in numbers less extreme) with respect to top 
management of nonfinancial corporations, and it is only constrained 
space that prevents me from adding additional examples. 
  
  
 
33
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (May 10, 2010). 
34
Morgan Stanley, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Aug. 9, 2010). 
35
See Bear Stearns Cos., Annual Report (Form 10-K, Ex. 13) (2007) (reporting 
compensation of $4.3 billion with $2 billion for common shareholders on net revenue 
of $9.2 billion); JP Morgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 24, 2010) 
(reporting $27 billion in compensation with $8.8 billion for common shareholders on 
net revenue of $100 billion); Merrill Lynch & Co, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 
25, 2008) (reporting $15.9 billion in compensation on net revenue of $11.2 billion). 
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